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WORK PRODUCT EXCEPTION TO DISCOVERY 
-THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 
Glenn E. Coven, ]r.t 
The various discovery devices of modem civil procedure are the 
keystone of the liberalized forms of pleading and practice. The adop-
tion of notice pleading has required the development of a new method 
for giving one's adversary sufficient information to permit him to pre-
pare his defense. Also, the "sporting" theory of justice has been dis-
placed by the belief that justice is served by revealing information and 
thereby minimizing surprise at trial. Thus, the decision to open pre-
trial channels of communication between parties not only resulted 
from the need to supplement notice pleading, but also countenanced 
a basic improvement in our judicial system. 
Nevertheless, the pretrial transmission of information among lit-
igants is not the only element in our system that promotes justice. At 
some point the policies embodied in discovery must give way to the 
competing policies that underlie other institutions, such as those under-
lying our adversarial system. The adversarial process begins be-
fore trial, since the parties must prepare their own cases and conduct 
their own investigations. Only through the independent efforts of ad-
versaries can the evidence be sifted properly and the legal theories 
analyzed adequately. These goals necessarily conflict with those of dis-
covery procedures, since the latter aim to reveal to each party the prod-
uct of the other's pretrial preparation. The conflict is especially salient 
where one party seeks to use discovery procedures to avail himself of 
what may constitute the opposing attorney's work product. 
In the few years since New York enacted its work product rule,1 
a surprisingly large body of interpretive law has developed. Partly 
because of this sudden surge of litigation, the New York courts have 
frequently turned to arbitrary classifications and ritualistic slogans to 
resolve their cases. As a result, the policies underlying the rule are in 
danger of lapsing into obscurity, and the principles that should guide 
application of the rule are in need of reformulation. 
t Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1963, Swarthmore College; LL.B. 1966, Columbia 
University. 
1 N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW§§ 3101(c)-(d) (McKinney 1963) [hereinafter cited as CPLR) pro-
vide that "[t]he work product of an attorney" cannot be discovered and that certain 
"(m]aterial prepared for litigation" is discoverable only if "injustice or undue hardship" 
would otherwise result. See pp. 100-101 infra. o 
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ANTECEDENTS oF THE NEw YoRK STATUTE 
99 
In Hickman v. Taylor,2 decided in 1947, the Supreme Court dealt 
with the conflicting policies underlying liberal discovery and the ad-
versarial system. Though the Court intended to establish a widely ap-
plicable rule,3 the facts of the case were actually quite narrow. An 
attorney retained specifically for litigation had elicited statements from 
witnesses; the Court held that the statements were not subject to dis-
covery absent a showing of necessity.4 
The Court reasoned that "the public policy underlying the orderly 
prosecution and defense of legal claims" made it "essential that a 
lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary 
intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel."5 A lack of such privacy 
would promote "[i]nefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices."6 The 
legal profession would become demoralized, and consequently "the 
cause of justice would be poorly served.''7 The Court enumerated "in-
terviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental im-
pressions, [and] personal beliefs" as some of the materials that would 
be covered by the work product rule.8 In sum, the rule is meant to 
protect the attorney whenever he is involved in the adversarial process. 
The Court in Hickman feared two undesirable results of discov-
ery. First, the professional independence of the attorney who moves 
for discovery is endangered by the possibility of a "free ride" at the 
expense of opposing counsel. Liberal discovery might corrode an at-
torney's motive to investigate the relevant evidence or develop legal 
theories independently. Since he may, therefore, exert less than his 
maximum effort, his client, and ultimately the cause of justice, will 
suffer. 
Second, discovery may interfere with the work of the attorney 
from whom it is sought. Were discovery unrestricted, the attorney 
would have to conduct his affairs guardedly in order to minimize the 
potential advantage that might be gained by opposing counsel. Thus, 
for example, interoffice memoranda would have to be destroyed for 
2 329 u.s. 495 (1947). 
s See id. at 510-14. 
4 Id. at 512. 
5 Id. at 510-11. 
6 Id. at 511. 
1 Id. 
s Id. 
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fear that opposing counsel might obtain access to the office files. Such 
disruption would disserve clients and impede justice. 
The rule of Hickman v. Taylor was meant to avert the disastrous 
consequences of unrestricted discovery. But because of the relatively 
simple fact pattern of the case, questions were left unanswered con-
cerning the full scope of work product protection. F<;>r example, should 
similar protection be afforded a private investigator who assists an at-
torney preparing for litigation? If so, must the investigation proceed 
under the direction of the attorney? How long before the trial can 
activity occur and still be protected? Should protection ever be ex-
tended to activities not oriented toward litigation? 
In the surprisingly few cases decided since Hickman~ the various 
circuit courts have tended to uphold the values behind full discovery 
and to restrict the scope of the work product rule.9 The leading deci-
sion to the contrary, Alltmont v. United States,l0 may have turned on 
the involvement of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.U Although 
some conflict concerning the extent of work product protection has 
evolved among the circuits,l2 the Supreme Court has not decided a 
work product case since Hickman. 
II 
THE NEw YoRK RuLE 
Most states have adopted work product rules, either by statute or 
through case development.13 The origin, purpose, and judicial treat-
ment of the rules vary so considerably that the only safe generalization 
is that state courts tend to restrict discovery more than do the federal 
courts.14 The New York rule, ultimately enacted as Section 3101 of 
the Civil Practice Law and Rules, 15 provides in pertinent part: 
9 E.g., Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963); Atlantic Greyhound 
Corp. v. Lauritzen, 182 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1950). 
10 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950). 
11 For no sound reason, courts have been reluctant to order discovery against federal 
investigative agents. See Snyder v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 {E.D.N.Y. 1956). 
12 Compare Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962), with Hauger v. 
Chicago, R.I. &: P.R.R., 216 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954). See generally 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, 1J 26.23 (2d ed. 1966). For an excellent summary of the conflicting federal deci-
sions, see American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277, 
285 (2d Cir. 1967) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting). 
13 See Comment, The Work Product Doctrine in the State Courts, 62 MICH. L. REv. 
1199 (1964). 
14 Compare Wise v. Western Union Tel. Co., 36 Del. 453, 178 A. 640 (1935), with 
Dean v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 104, 324 P.2d 764 (1958). See IowA R. CIV. P. 141(a); 
ME. R. CIV. P. 26(b); Mo. R. CIV. P. 410, § d; N.J.R. CIV. P. 4:16-2. For rules which make 
the prohibition absolute and not voidable on a showing of necessity, see, e.g., Mo. R. CIV. 
P. 57.01(b); PA. R. CIV. P. 401l(d). 
15 CPLR § 3101. 
Ø»·²Ñ²´·²» óó ëí Ý±®²»´´ Ôò Î»ªò ïðï ïçêéóïçêè
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(a) Generally. There shall be full disclosure of all evidence mate-
rial and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regard-
less of the burden of proof . . . . 
(c) Attorney's work product. The work product of an attorney 
shall not be obtainable. 
(d) Material prepared for litigation. The following shall not be 
obtainable unless the court finds that the material can no longer 
be duplicated because of a change in conditions and that withhold-
ing it will result in injustice or undue hardship: 
1. any opinion of an expert prepared for litigation; and 
2. any ·writing or anything created by or for a party or his 
agent in preparation for litigation. 
101 
The legislative history of the section is helpful in determining 
precisely what items the legislature intended to protect. Originally, the 
Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, the draftsmen of the 
CPLR, had intended the New York rule to parallel the federal case 
law. Their report stated: "The rule laid down ... in Hickman v. 
Taylor ... has been adopted."16 Recognizing the lack of uniformity 
among the circuits, the committee recommended that developments 
in the Second Circuit be followedP The district courts in the Second 
Circuit, which are among the most liberal in ordering discovery, sel-
dom uphold work product claims.18 Thus, the committee must have 
intended only a narrow restriction on discovery. Presumably, they had 
concluded that Hickman and subsequent federal cases had achieved a 
workable balance of interests. 
The rule proposed by the Advisory Committee in 1961, however, 
differed from that finally enacted by the legislature. The proposal pro-
vided in part: 
(c) Attorney's work product; material prepared for litigation. The 
following shall not be obtainable unless the court finds that with-
holding it will result in injustice or undue hardship: 
16 N.Y. TEMPORARY CoMM'N ON THE COURTS, FIRST PREUMINARY REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY ColiiMITI'EE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1957 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 6(b), at 120. 
17 Id. 
18 For example, one court, refusing to extend work product protection to accident 
reports prepared by postal employees, reasoned that there was no showing that legal 
knowledge was used in creating the report and held that the mere prospect of litigation 
was insufficient to bring the reports within the ambit of protection. Burke v. United States, 
32 F.R.D. 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). See also Brown v. New York, N.H. 8: H.R.R., 17 F.R.D. 
324 (E.D.N.Y. 1955); Szymanski v. New York, N.H. 8: H.R.R., 14 F.R.D. 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
Another court permitted discovery of narrative statements written by the defendants to 
the attorney setting forth certain facts in the case. Lundberg v. Welles, 11 F.R.D. 136 
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
Ø»·²Ñ²´·²» óó ëí Ý±®²»´´ Ôò Î»ªò ïðî ïçêéóïçêè
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I. the work product of an attorney; 
2. any opinion of an expert prepared for litigation; and 
3. any writing or any thing created by or for a party or his 
agent in preparation for litigation.19 
The legislature, however, partially rejected the recommendation and 
abandoned the notion that the broad range of material protected from 
full discovery can be treated uniformly. The more complex rule that 
was adopted shifted the emphasis somewhat in favor of protecting the 
la,vyer and restricting discovery. 
The final version first appeared in the Fifth Report,20 published 
only a few weeks after the Final Report of the Advisory Committee 
and actually constituting the first report prepared by a legislative com-
mittee. Unfortunately, the revision contained no explanation of either 
the reason for the change or its intended effect. There is nothing to 
suggest, however, that the legislature intended to increase the classes 
of materials protected. Rather, the change merely singled out for fur-
ther insulation a class of materials already partially protected-"work 
product." Thus, the New York rule was meant to be no broader than 
that applied in the district courts of the Second Circuit. 
III 
JUDICIAL CoNsTRuCTioN OF "MATERIAL 
PREPARED FOR LITIGATION" 
Subsection (c), the work product rule, covers only a narrow range 
of items closely associated with the thought processes of an attorney, 
and has been of little significance in the courts.21 When protection is 
19 N.Y. FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE A-432 
(Advance Draft, Edward Thompson Co. 1961). 
20 N.Y. SENATE FINANCE COMM, & AssEMBLY WAYS AND MEANS COMM,, FIFTH PRE· 
LIMINARY REPORT ON REVISION OF THE CIVIL PRAcnCE Acr, 1961 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No, 15, 
at 443-44. 
21 The absolute immunity accorded an attorney's work product is a substantial de-
parture from the general policy favoring disclosure. Because the harsh result of applying 
subsection (c) can rarely, if ever, be justified, the provision should be construed as narrowly 
as is consistent with protecting the adversarial system in the most restricted sense of that 
term. Limiting this subsection to materials containing an attorney's "analysis and trial 
strategy" seems most appropriate, and the legislature probably intended no more. See 3 
J. WEINSTEIN, H. KoRN, & A. MILLER, NEw YoRK CIVIL PRAcriCE 'if 3101.44 (Supp. 1966). 
Happily, the courts have so construed this provision. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Manhattan & 
Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 47 Misc. 2d 765, 263 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Civ. Ct. 1965), 
rev'd on other grounds, 27 App. Div. 2d 185, 277 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1st Dep't 1967); Wickham 
v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 45 Misc. 2d 311, 256 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Babcock v. 
Jackson, 40 Misc. 2d 757, 243 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1963). The single suggestion that sub-
section (c) might be read expansively, a dictum in Kandel v. Tocher, 22 App. Div. 2d 
513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1965), is out of line with the decided cases. 
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sought for the more unusual items, subsection (d) is the applicable 
provision. Thus, an examination of the scope of the New York rule 
must concentrate on the judicial treatment accorded subsection (d). 
The subsection conditionally exempts from discovery two classes 
of material: the opinion of an expert prepared for litigation, and "any 
·writing or anything created by or for a party or his agent in prepara-
tion for litigation." The provision concerning the opinion of an expert 
has assumed no importance in the case law and will not be considered 
further. The second exclusion, however, is probably the most litigated 
provision in the CPLR, because it is potentially applicable in almost 
every tort litigation involving either a self-insurer or an insurance 
cbmpany. Most of the cases decided under subsection (d) have con-
cerned either accident reports given by an employee to his employer, 
or reports given by an insured to his insurance company. 
A. Accident Reports 
Cases involving accident reports deal principally with the ques-
tion whether a document prepared for many purposes may be protected 
under subsection (d). The answer in each case depends partly on the 
interpretation given the expression "preparation for litigation" and 
partly on the applicable rules of evidence. 
1. Regular Course of Business 
Most corporations and individuals create and retain myriad rec-
ords, which constitute potential evidence in any future litigation. A 
vendor, for example, retains a receipt for each delivery of goods. Should 
the vendee later deny having received them, the receipt would be vitally 
important in any resulting litigation. The vendor is probably aware of 
potential litigation when he preserves the receipt, but since discovery 
would in no way threaten the adversial system, the materials should not 
be protected. Thus, preservation of a document partly because it may 
become useful in a subsequent lawsuit does not properly constitute 
"preparation for litigation." Shortly after enactment of the CPLR, the 
courts distinguished materials prepared in the regular course of busi-
ness from those prepared for litigation.22 They concluded that, where a 
document is routinely created and preserved, its potential use in litiga-
tion is too speculative to justify the application of subsection (d).23 
22 E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 40 Misc. 2d 757, 243 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1963). 
23 Compare In re City of New York, 43 Misc. 2d 173, 174, 250 N.Y.S.2d 664, 666 
(Sup. Ct. 1964) ("dominant purpose') and Board of Educ. v. Ace Test Boring, Inc., 47 
Misc. 2d 864, 263 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. I965), with Renwal Prods., Inc. v. Kleen-Stik 
Prods., Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 644, 251 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
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When an accident occurs, however, subsequent litigation may be 
probable rather than merely possible. But since accident reports have 
a multitude of business uses,24 they may not qualify as material "pre-
pared for litigation." The questions before courts in accident report 
cases are (1) how prominent a motive for preparation was the potential 
litigation, and (2) how likely was it that there would be subsequent 
litigation? The answers to these questions may vary independently of 
whether the report was prepared routinely.25 Recognizing this diffi-
culty in an early decision, the Appellate Division, Second Department, 
squarely held that routine creation of materials does not alone pre-
clude the application of subsection (d).26 Both the First and Third 
Departments have reached similar conclusions. 
O'Neill v. Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Au-
thority21 concerned a traffic accident involving one of defendant's buses. 
It was standard procedure for the bus driver to fill out a printed form 
and mail it directly to defendant's attorney. The attorney filed an 
affidavit with the court stating that the report was for his exclusive use, 
and argued that it was absolutely protected either under the attorney-
client privilege or under subsection (c). The trial court summarily re-
jected these assertions because of the insignificant role of the attorney 
in the preparation of the report.28 The court also rejected a claim under 
subsection (d) on the ground that such reports should, and probably 
would, be used by utilities for a variety of business purposes. The 
fact that the report was mailed to the attorney was treated as evidence, 
but was not conclusive.29 Alternatively, at the time the report was 
prepared its use in litigation was too speculative to qualify for sub-
section (d) protection.3o 
On appeal, the First Department took a different view of the facts 
and reversed.31 It construed the evidence as clearly demonstrating that 
the report was for the exclusive use of the attorney and that, if man-
24 For example, they may be used to improve working conditions, or to discipline 
employees. 
25 Brown v. Saint Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 36, 62 N.W.2d 688, 701·02 (1954); Note, 
Aspects of the Minnesota Rule Prohibiting Discovery of Work-Product and Expert 
Conclusions, 48 MINN. L. REV. 977, 987 (1964). 
26 Reese v. Long Island R.R., 24 App. Div. 2d 581, 262 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1965). 
27 27 App. Div. 2d 185, 277 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1st Dep't 1967), rev'g 47 Misc. 2d 765, 263 
N.Y.S.2d 187 (Civ. Ct. 1965). 
28 47 Misc. 2d at 768, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 190. 
29 Id. at 770, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 192. 
30 Id. at 771, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 193. 
31 O'Neill v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 27 App. Div. 
2d 185, 277 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1st Dep't 1967). 
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agement sought to investigate the accident for other purposes, other 
reports would be prepared, which would be discoverable by plaintiff.32 
The court did not address itself to the alternative ground relied upon 
below that, when the report was made, the prospect of litigation was 
too "hypothetical" to justify subsection (d) protection. Significantly, 
however, the court added: 
[I]t would not be the actual use to which the particular report was 
put that would be significant. If the practice of the utility was to 
have the reports available for uses other than litigation, they are 
not protected.33 
Parker v. New York Telephone Co.,34 also a borderline case, was 
in some respects similar. There a railroad employee was in jured by 
wires of the defendant telephone company. Plaintiff sought statements 
that had been taken by "defendant self-insurer's claims bureau" from 
witnesses who were employees of the railroad. The court concluded 
that there could be "no reasonable conclusion other than that the state-
ments were created in preparation for litigation .... "35 
It appears, therefore, that a court will protect an accident report, 
whether routinely prepared or not, if it was prepared exclusively for 
litigation and is not available to management generally.36 This stand-
ard provides a reasonable basis for distinguishing the mass of discover-
able material from that which clearly deserves protection. 
2. Probability of Litigation 
The more difficult question is how likely litigation must appear at 
the time the report is prepared in order for it to receive protection. The 
First Department indicated, in any early decision, that a report made 
shortly after an accident would be subject to discovery.37 The reasoning 
has persisted that the timing of the report might be critical.38 Thus, in 
O'Neill the lower court suggested that reports made almost immediately 
32 Id. at 186, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 772. 
33 Id. at 187, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 773. 
34 24 App. Div. 2d 1067, 265 N.Y.S.2d 740 (3d Dep't 1965), affg 47 Misc. 2d 342, 262 
N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
35 I d. at 1068, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 742. 
36 Haire v. Long Island R.R., 53 Misc. 2d 536, 279 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Sup. Ct. 1967); see 
Weisgold v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 456, 273 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1966); 
In re Brooklyn Bridge S.W. Urban Renewal Project, 50 Misc. 2d 478, 270 N.Y.S.2d 703 
(Sup. Ct. 1966). 
37 Bloom v. New York City Transit Auth., 20 App. Div. 2d 687, 246 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st 
Dep't 1964). 
38 E.g., Board of Educ. v. Ace Test Boring, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 864, 263 N.Y.S.2d 193 
(Sup. Ct. 1965). 
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after the event would not normally be protected, since litigation was 
then too hypothetical.39 
The question of timing is most important when a report was pre-
pared exclusively for possible litigation. To consider all such reports 
as "prepared for litigation," regardless of the timing, would result in 
an unwarranted extension of Hickman.40 The "preparation for litiga-
tion" concept must be understood and applied in light of the policy 
conflict the Hickman Court sought to resolve. 
In applying the attorney-client privilege, courts need not distin-
guish between trial preparations and other communications with the 
attorney, since the privilege persists throughout the relationship. The 
privilege is unlimited in time because the interest of full and free 
communication deserves protection without regard to whether litiga-
tion is imminent or even foreseeable. 
The work product doctrine, however, is entirely different. It was 
born of an awareness that a trial is not a collegial search for truth and 
that the independence of adversaries must be preserved. Routine gath-
ering of data bears none of the earmarks of the adversarial process, 
particularly when done by an investigator who is not supervised di-
rectly by an attorney. The advantage gained by discovering a factual 
recitation of an event is no less warranted than that gained by dis-
covering any other type of evidence. An attorney is no more disrupted 
and his privacy is no more invaded by having to copy and deliver a 
document prepared without his substantial help than by having to 
divulge any other nonprivileged communication. An attorney may 
regret discovery when it hurts rather than helps his client, but the 
battle over pretrial discovery was concluded long ago. 
The picture changes, of course, when litigation becomes a con-
crete expectation. No longer is the attorney or his agent interested 
merely in learning what transpired. Seeking out favorable witnesses, 
he selectively develops evidence that tends to support or refute one or 
another legal theory. Here the unfairness of rooting through the papers 
of one's adversary is manifest; and here the work product rule may 
properly be invoked. To be sure, competent attorneys and even well-
trained investigators are always attuned to favorable evidence and are 
guided by an awareness of some possible line of argument. But dis-
39 47 Misc. 2d at 771, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 193. 
40 See Menyweather v. Niagara Frontier Transit Sys., Inc., 50 Misc. 2d 244, 269 
N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1965), afYd, 25 App. Div. 2d 821, 269 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (4th Dep't 1966), 
where the lower court suggested that the first report of an accident made by an employee 
to his public utility employer might always be deemed made in the regular course of 
business and thus always discoverable. 
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covery should be disallowed only when inconsistent with the minimum 
requirement of safeguarding the integrity of the attorney's work. This 
point is not reached until the litigation appears reasonably probable. 
Absent some showing that the report was prepared at a time when 
there was substantial reason to believe that litigation would ensue, 
discovery of accident reports should be permitted even if they were 
prepared for the sole use of an attorney.4l 
An analogous problem was dealt with recently in Corona Courts, 
Inc. v. Frank G. Shattuck Co.42 The grantor of a franchise to operate 
a motel conducted an investigation of the grantee's business, and on 
the basis of the resulting report he sought to terminate the franchise. 
The grantee's effort to discover the report was rebuffed under subsec-
tion (d). The court reasoned that the investigation was not in the reg-
ular course of business but was directed toward a specific problem.43 
But that should not be dispositive. As in the accident report cases, the 
court should have considered the precise function the report served. 
If the grantor had concluded that something was seriously amiss at the 
motel and had ordered the report to substantiate his doubts, the report 
was probably deserving of protection. The termination of a valuable 
franchise was contemplated at the time the report was made, and such 
a termination would likely entail litigation. On the other hand, if the 
report was merely a spotcheck on a motel having some difficulties or 
if it was a part of a periodic review, discovery would have been proper, 
even if the report formed the sole basis for any resulting litigation.44 
3. Identity of the Person Preparing the Report 
The courts have viewed the involvement of a claims agent or an 
attorney as evidence of preparation for litigation. The absence of such 
involvement is, of course, nearly conclusive evidence that the report 
should not be protected. Under these circumstances protection is proper 
only if litigation was imminent and if the one taking the statement 
delivered it to the legal department without making other use of it. 
The converse, however, is not true. A statement should not be protected 
merely because it was taken by an attorney. As noted in O'Neill, the 
inquiry is not who takes the statement but who uses it, and the language 
41 "It seems clear and long has been recognized that discovery should provide a 
party access to anything that is evidence in his case." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 
515 (1947) Uackson, J., concurring). See also Note, Work Product in Criminal Discovery, 
!966 WASH. U.L.Q. 321. 
42 50 Misc. 2d 1066, 272 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
43 Id. at 1067,272 N.Y.S.2d at 219. 
44 See Ruggeiro v. Board of Educ., 49 Misc. 2d 532, 267 N.Y.S.2d 942 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
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in Parker to the contrary is certainly ·wrong. Even a report prepared for 
the exclusive use of an attorney or claims agent should not be protected 
under subsection (d) unless it was prepared specifically for litigation.45 
4. Burden of Proof 
While the departments of the Appellate Division seem in general 
agreement on the law, for a time there appeared to be a conflict among 
them, the First Department allowing discovery of items which the 
Second Department protected under subsection (d).46 Closer analysis 
reveals that the actual conflict concerned such evidentiary matters as 
burden of proof. 
In an early case, the First Department announced the general rule 
that reports submitted by an employee to his employer prior to the 
institution of suit would not be protected.47 This holding was amplified 
in Kandel v. Tocher,48 which distinguished reports to insurers from 
internal reports made as a part of the normal business routine and used 
for a variety of purposes. In a third and more recent case,49 the First 
Department again permitted discovery of an accident report, but noted 
that there was no showing that the report had in fact been prepared 
for litigation. 
Clearly, the Second Department has denied discovery where the 
First Department would have allowed it; to this extent the departments 
have split.50 Nevertheless, the Second Department initially held only 
that accident reports would be protected unless they were prepared in 
the regular course of business.51 In a later case, Reese v. Long Island 
Railroad, 52 the trial court, expressly seeking to follow the distinctions 
set out in Kandel, permitted discovery of statements taken by a claims 
agent of the railroad. The rationale was that such a report is a matter 
of internal routine and is created to serve many purposes. 53 The Second 
45 See Brunswick Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 49 Misc. 2d 1018, 269 N.Y.S.2d 80 
(Sup. C:t. 1966). 
46 See Speight v. Allen, 44 Misc. 2d 1072, 255 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
47 Bloom v. New York City Transit Auth., 20 App. Div. 2d 687, 246 N.Y.S.2d 414 
(1st Dep't 1964). 
48 22 App. Div. 2d 518, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1965). 
49 Metropolitian Life Ins. Co. v. Lane Klinow & Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 646, 257 N.Y.S.2d 
415 (1st Dep't 1965). 
50 See 3 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KoRN, & A. MILLER, NEW YoRK CIVIL PRACTICE 1J 8101.50a 
(Supp. 1966). 
51 Bresson v. Radio City Music Hall Corp., 28 App. Div. 2d 581, 256 N.Y.S.2d 758 
(2d Dep't 1965); Lonigro v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 22 App. Div. 2d 918, 255 N.Y.S.2d 737 
(2d Dep't 1964). 
52 24 App. Div. 2d 581, 262 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1965), rev'g 46 Misc. 2d 5, 259 
N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
53 46 Misc. 2d at 7, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 238. 
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Department reversed on the facts, declaring that insufficient considera-
tion had been given the railroad's argument that the report was in 
fact created solely for trial use.54 The lower court's reasoning was char-
acterized as logically compelling a rule th~t no accident report routinely 
created can be treated as preparation for litigation. This reasoning was 
rejected as too broad. 55 
The First Department permits discovery on a showing that the 
report was made to the employer in accord with usual business prac-
tice,56 though the court is open to a showing that a particular accident 
report was prepared for the limited purpose of litigation. In the 
O'Neill case, the First Department found that such a showing had been 
made, and therefore granted protection under subsection (d). The 
Second Department, unlike the First, does not assume that a report 
prepared in the normal course of business is meant to serve a variety 
of business purposes. Rather, the burden is on the party seeking dis-
covery to show that the report is in fact multifunctional. 
This extra burden of proof on the party seeking discovery is an 
unwarranted impediment to the pretrial process. While the work 
product rule serves a legitimate function in the administration of 
justice, the general policy of the law favors discovery. The party seeking 
the benefit of an exception to discovery should, therefore, bear the 
burden of showing that the exception applies.57 Furthermore, the facts 
surrounding the creation and use of the materials are known, perhaps 
exclusively, to the one who instigated their preparation and who now 
resists their discovery. As a matter of fairness and expeditious trial 
administration, the burden of proof should be on the resisting party.58 
Finally, statements that may be used in a variety of ways probably will 
be used in a variety of ways. The party asserting the less probable should 
bear the burden of proof. Where a statement is obviously useful for 
several purposes, the party resisting discovery should have to show that 
it was used exclusively for litigation purposes. 
54 24 App. Div. 2d at 581, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 195. 
55 Id. 
56 But see Loubriel v. Grace Line, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 90, 274 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Sup. Ct. 
1966), where the court stated it would allow discovery only if the moving party proved 
that the statements were not taken in preparation for litigation. The better rule was 
stated in Weisgold v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 456, 273 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. 
Ct. 1966), where discovery was permitted on a showing that the document was created in 
the normal course of business. The court remarked that there was no showing by the 
resisting party that "the report in question was prepared specifically and solely in con-
templation of litigation ..•. " Id. at 460, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 284. 
57 See Weisgold v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 456, 273 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. 
Ct. 1966). 
58 The unfairness of the rule on burden of proof that has been adopted by the Sec-
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In practice, then, the party seeking discovery should be able to 
overcome a subsection (d) defense by a nominal showing that the mate-
rial was prepared in the course of routine business practice. Discovery 
should be ordered unless the resisting party can satisfactorily demon-
strate the applicability of the exception.59 
The Third Department, following the better rule of the First, has 
held that the burden rests on the party resisting discovery to show 
that the subsection (d) exception applies.60 A court in the Fourth De-
partment has reached a similar conclusion. Emphasizing that the report 
was submitted to the corporate employer and not to an insurance com-
pany, the court "assumed" it was made in the regular course of 
business.61 
B. Reports to Insurance Companies 
Most of the cases arising under subsection (d) involve efforts by 
plaintiffs to discover statements of an insured defendant to his automo-
bile liability insurance company. Although the courts have treated the 
insurance cases as unique, the issues are similar to those previously 
considered. An important question is whether litigation was sufficiently 
certain when the report was made to warrant application of subsection 
(d). An even more fundamental question is whether insurance com-
panies can ever qualify for the protection of subsection (d). 
Automobile liability insurance companies usually require their 
insureds to file a report with the company immediately after any acci-
dent. Presumably the document is the primary source of information 
to the insurer in deciding how to proceed. Plaintiffs often seek to dis-
cover the report, not only because the insurance company is likely to 
ond Department appears most clearly in Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank v. Lerner, 25 App. Div. 
2d 436,266 N.Y.S.2d 914 (2d Dep't 1966). The court accepted what it termed the "somewhat 
conclusory statements" of plaintiff bank's attorney and vice·president that the memorandum 
in question was protected by subsection (d), and held that the defendant had failed to 
prove the contrary. In order to obtain such proof, however, defendant would have had to 
conduct discovery concerning the collateral question of how and why such memoranda 
are prepared. Though defendant could not have accomplished this without incurring 
prohibitive expense, it would have been a simple matter for the bank to substantiate its 
assertion. In Haire v. Long Island R.R., 53 Misc. 2d 536, 279 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Sup. Ct. 1967), 
similarly conclusory allegations by the resisting party were rejected as insufficient to show 
preparation for litigation. 
59 Of course, once the exception is shown to apply, the party seeking discovery bears 
the burden of showing injustice or undue hardship sufficient to justify discovery under sub· 
section (d). Cf. McCoy, California Civil Discovery: Work Product of Attorneys, 18 STAN. 
:L. REv. 783, 804·05 (1966). 
60 Linton v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 25 App. Div. 2d 334, 269 N.Y.S.2d 490 (3d Dep't 1966). 
61 Davis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 45 Misc. 2d 1006, 258 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
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rely on it, but also because it may be useful in impeaching the defen-
dant's later statements. Normally, the party who made the report is 
available for pretrial examination. Thus, if the report is covered by 
subsection (d), the requisite necessity for avoiding the conditional 
privilege is difficult to establish. As might have been expected, some of 
the first cases decided under the CPLR involved the application of 
subsection (d) to reports made to insurers.62 
The trial courts initially split on the question, the majority of them 
holding the items protected. No persuasive rationale for their decisions 
was presented; presumably the courts preferred to await guidelines 
from the Appellate Division. Those that permitted discovery spoke of 
the broad policy favoring full disclosure; 63 some looked to whether 
the statement was made before or after the institution of suit.64 Courts 
that protected the reports noted that subsection (e) permitted dis-
covery of one's ovm statement but not that of ari adversary.65 In gen-
eral, they assumed that automobile insurers contemplate litigation after 
evecy accident.66 
In 1965 the issue came before the First and Second Departments, 
and they concurred in holding the statements protected. In the first 
of these cases, Finegold v. Lewis,61 the Second Department did not ap-
preciably improve upon the reasoning of the lower courts. Noting 
that the insurance company is "in a very real sense" a defendant, 68 the 
court disposed of the "preparation for litigation" question by asserting 
that the activities of an insurance company are always in preparation 
for litigation. 69 
Speaking for the First Department in Kandel v. Tocher,1° Justice 
Breitel set out more extensively the guidelines of protection under 
subsection (d). He expressly limited·the decision to situations involv-
ing automobile liability insurance, which was characterized as "simply 
litigation insurance."71 Internal accident reports of a public utility 
62 Analogous problems arise when a police officer involved in an accident submits a 
report to a self-insuring municipality. Donnelly v. County of Nassau, 46 Misc. 2d 895, 
261 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Sup. Ct. 1965), applied the rationale of the insurance company cases to 
a police officer's report. 
63 E.g., Calace v. Battaglia, 44 Misc. 2d 97, 252 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
64 E.g., Doughty v. Greenberg, 43 Misc. 2d 267, 250 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
65 E.g., Braxton v. Batey, 44 Misc. 2d 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
66 E.g., Maiden v. Aid Carpet Serv., Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 660, 251 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 
1964). 
67 22 App. Div. 2d 447, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't 1965). 
68 !d. at 448, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 359. 
69 Id. 
70 22 App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1965). 
71 !d. at 515, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 900. 
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made in the normal course of business and used for a variety of pur-
poses were distinguished on the ground that every act of the insurer is 
in preparation for either litigation or settlement.72 Justice Breitel rea-
soned that, as a matter of sound policy, protection from discovery was 
necessary to encourage full disclosure by the insured to his insurer.73 
The court deemed it immaterial that no attorney was involved at the 
time the statement was made, because a liability insurer is "an institu-
tionalized substitute for the individualized attorney-client relation-
ship .... " 74 
It is not entirely clear that automobile liability insurance may be 
distinguished from other types of insurance by being characterized as 
"litigation insurance." Most claims arising out of automobile accidents 
are settled before litigation becomes a serious possibility. Furthermore, 
at the time a report is filed there is usually some doubt about who was 
at fault; it is seldom clear whether the one submitting the report will 
be a plaintiff or a defendant. The report is not filed in "preparation for 
litigation," since the decision to litigate is not reached until after the 
contents of the report are analyzed. When a routine claim becomes a 
probable source of litigation, subsequent reports and documents may 
qualify for protection. The initial report should rarely qualify. 
The Kandel opinion iguored the multiformity of claims. Most 
reports to insurance companies concern minor accidents, and there is 
little likelihood that small claims will proceed to litigation. They are 
commonly settled by employees of the insurer who have had only super-
ficial training. To protect such reports under a rule designed to pre-
serve the adversarial system is preposterous. 
Since automobile liability insurance companies do not treat every 
claim as likely to be litigated, their activities are difficult to distinguish 
from those of other insurers for the purposes of subsection (d). All 
insurers are contractually obligated to pay for specified costs of the 
insured under certain conditions. They all gather information, usually 
from the insured, to ascertain whether they are so obligated and to 
determine the amount of the obligation. They all run the ·risk ·of in-
volvement in litigation if their valuation of the damage is not accepted. 
But the court in Kandel specifically distinguished other insurers, and 
the courts have in fact treated discovery against other insurers on a case-
by-case basis, as with accident report cases.75 For example, a routine 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 517, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 902. 
74 Id. at 518, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 902. 
75 Id. at 515, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 899. 
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report of an insurance adjuster is not protected, 76 whereas protection is 
accorded the report of an agent investigating a doubtful claim77 and 
the report of an auditor retained in anticipation of the filing of a 
fraudulent claim.78 Though the likelihood of litigation is greatest with 
respect to automobile liability insurance, clearly a prospect of litigation 
is not sufficient to invoke either subsection (c) or (d). 
Even if an insurance company treats a claim as likely to result in 
litigation, the policies underlying Hickman v. Taylor probably should 
not be extended to protect the relevant materials. Potential discovery 
is unlikely to have the same effect on an insurance company as on an 
attorney. 
In describing insurance companies as institutionalized attorneys, 
the Kandel court may have been attempting to counter this objection 
by stressing the importance of full disclosure by the insured. But the 
argument is wide of the mark. The court was asserting the desirability 
of a communications privilege between the insured and the insurer 
analogous to the attorney-client privilege. But since subsection (d) 
was designed to serve a different function altogether, the judiciary 
would not be justified in interpreting it as creating an insured-insurer 
privilege. 
The court's error can be perceived by comparing subsection (d) 
with a hypothetical insured-insurer privilege, which presumably would 
operate similarly to the attorney-client privilege.79 The attorney-client 
privilege is properly a client's privilege, designed to enable him to 
speak freely to his counsel. Only the client may waive the privilege, 
and. the attorney must respect that waiver. The Hickman rule, on the 
other hand, is designed to protect the attorney functioning in his pro-
fessional capacity during litigation. Under subsection (d) the rule does 
not protect the client, because the adversary may obtain the materials 
if he demonstrates that he needs them. Should the legislature determine 
that an insured-insurer privilege is desirable, it could easily enact the 
appropriate legislation. It is quite improper for the courts to distort 
subsection (d) to that purpose. 
76 Welch v. Globe Indem. Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 70, 267 N.Y.S.2d 48 (3d Dep't 1966). 
77 Brunswick Corp. v. Aetna Cas.&: Sur. Co., 49 Misc. 2d 1018, 269 N.Y.S.2d 30 (Sup. 
Ct. 1966), modified, 27 App. Div. 2d 182, 278 N.Y.S.2d 459 (4th Dep't 1967). The Appellate 
Division examined the facts even more closely than had the trial court and broadened 
the discovery order to include data obtained before the intervention of an .attorney. 
See also Albano v. Schwab Bros. Trucking, Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 901, 278 N.Y.S.2d 780 
(4th Dep't 1967); Raylite Elec. Corp. v. New York Fire Ins. Co., 46 Misc. 2d 361, 259 
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
78 Kent v. Maryland Cas. Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 653, 268 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1st Dep't 1966). 
79 Sc:c: Aldrich v, Catel Serv, Co., 51 Misc. 2d 16, 272 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Civ. Ct. 1966). 
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Subsection (d) is designed to allow preparation for litigation with-
out fear of discovery and to protect against the demoralizing effect of 
the "free ride."80 To determine whether subsection (d) should be ap-
plied to automobile liability insurance companies, the courts should 
consider whether the insurer's operations would in fact be impaired 
by the possibility of discovery. In light of the extensive operations of 
insurance companies and the consequent division of functions, it seems 
doubtful that discovery would appreciably affect or demoralize either 
those who litigate claims or those who investigate them. Yet, the courts 
have failed to consider whether there is any need at all to apply sub-
section (d) to such companies. Absent such a need, discovery should be 
allowed in accordance with the general policy favoring full disclosure.81 
CONCLUSION 
Although discovery has long been ingrained in our civil practice, 
the feeling lingers that there is something essentially unfair about root-
ing through the papers of one's adversary. Thus, it is not surprising that 
after the Supreme Court sanctioned an exception to federal discovery 
nearly every state followed suit. Indeed, many courts have applied the 
exception far more broadly than necessary.82 
In New York, Section 310l(d) of the CPLR has been misapplied 
because the courts have failed to discriminate between materials pre-
pared for litigation and materials that merely form the basis for 
deciding whether to litigate. Until the decision to litigate has been 
reached, and until the adversarial process has begun, the exception to 
discovery should not be applied. 
The cases decided under subsection (d) have generally sought to 
apply the provisions mechanically, whereas a proper decision requires 
careful analysis of the facts of each case. Although a decision under 
subsection (d) is not on the merits, and although a good procedural 
rule should be easy to apply, practice should not become rigid before 
the judiciary has thoroughly investigated the policies embodied in a 
rule. Since courts have seldom undertaken such an inquiry, they have 
so far failed to isolate the narrow factual settings that justify exemption 
from discovery. 
80 See p. 99 supra. 
81 This conclusion in no way limits the protection of subsection (d) to attorneys. If, 
after the distillation process, an unsettled case is referred to the legal department for 
further action, the work of nonlegal investigators may well deserve protection. 
82 E.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Allen, 40 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1949). 
